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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE

~lATTER

OF THE ESTATE

OF
BEK B. ELLER.BECK, also kno,vn as B.

B. ELLERBECK,
D-eceased.

Case No. 8010
WITTON B. ELLERBECK,
Contestant and App·ella.nt)
-vs.-

RUTH C·LAYTON HAWS,
Proponent and Re:spondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF' THE· c·ASE
This is an appeal from an order admitting the will of
Ben B. Ellerbeck to probate (R. 46, 48).
Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws on May 2, 1952, petitioned
the court for the probate of an olographic will in the
matter of the estate of Ben B. Eller beck, deceased. Thereafter, Witton B. Ellerbeck, brother and only heir of the
deceased, filed his petition in opposition to the probate
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of said will. His opposition to the probate of the will
was based upon two grounds : First, that the said Ben
B. Ellerbeck was not competent to make a Last 'Yill and
Testament because of unsoundness of 1nind and second.
because the will was a contingent or conditional 'vill and
was only to take effect if he did not survive the sirlmess
then being experienced by him in the Holy Cross Hospital.
A pretrial was held January 5, 1953, and the eourt
took under advisement the contention of contestant that
the will was contingent. On January 7, 1953, the court
ruled that "the will is not ambiguous and that the will
is absolute, and is not conditional" (R. 25).
At the time set for trial the contestant did not sub1nit
any evidence concerning the mental incompeten~y of the
deceased, but still asserted that the will was conditional
(R. 31).
The court thereupon ruled that the will should be
admitted to probate (R. 4'2') and signed the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Admitting 'Viii to
Probate (R. 44 to 46).
The only contention here made by the conte~tant
is that the will is conditional or contingent and should
not have been admitted to probate.
The testimony established that the deceased, Ben
B. Ellerbeck, was admitted to the Holy Cross Hospital
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about ~ :00 p.In. on September 27, 1951 ( R. 38). The
proponent "\Yent to the hospital to see Mr. Ellerbeck.
She testified that he "\vas very sick and:
~'Q.

And he "\vas afraid he was going to die, wasn't
heJ?

..:\._.

Well, I guess he "\vas; I don't know." (R. 38)

The \Yill "Tas made on September 29, 1951 (R. 36).
Examination of the "\vill discloses that it is on the front
side of a statement from the Granite Mart, Inc. to R ..
Clayton Ha,vs, the proponent, for ladies shoes apparently
purchased August 17th.
The \vill is short and we quote it for the convenience
•
of the Court :
"Sept. 29, 1951
''To whom it may concern:
Being in the Holy Cross Hospital from digestive and other troubles, in the event that I do
not survive, Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws is to take
full charge of my home and such little business as
may exist there. F'urther, she is to have my complete portion of the estate left by my father,
namely Witton W. Ellerbeck.
SignedBen B. Ellerbeck
P.S.. I appoint Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws to serve
as executrix without bond.
Signed B. B. Ellerbeck"
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The deceased was in the hospital about one "~eek
(R. 35), recovered fro1n his illness and later was seen to
work around his yard and shop and appeared to be all
right during that period of time (R. 39). He died on the
30th day of April, 1952 (R. 46).

S.T·ATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT F:OR REVERSAL OF JUDG}\IENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS ABSOLUTE AND
WAS NOT CONDITIONAL OR CONTINGENT AND IN ADMITTING SAID WILL TO PROBATE .

•ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS ABSOLUTE AND
WAS NOT CONDITIONAL OR CONTINGENT AND IN ADMITTING SAID WILL TO PROBATE.

The courts are unanimous in holding that if a '"ill
is contingent or conditional it should not be ad1nitted
to probate unless the condition set forth in the will has
occurred as therein contemplated. In 57 Ant. Jur. 453,
Wills, Sec. 671, the foregoing rule is set forth as follow~:
"A conditional or contingent will is one whieh
is dependent for its operation upon the happening
of a specified condition or contingeney. If t.he
condition fails, the will is inoperative and void
thereafter, unless it is republished."
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·The follo,ving definition of a contingent will is given

in 1 Page on TT'ills (Lifetime Edition), page 204, Sec.

92:
" . A. contingent or conditional will is one, by
the tern1s of vvhich, the will is not to take effect
unless so1ne condition precedent has happened,
or \Yhich is not to take effect, if some specified
condition has happened. Because of statutory requirements as to the form in which a will must be
drawn, this condition must appear upon the face
of the will itself."

In determining whether or not this is a conditional
will the intention of the maker of the will is controlling.
57 Am. Jtttr. 454, Sec. 672, sets forth the rule as follows:
"Whether or not a will is to be regarded as
contingent depends upon the intention of the
testator.
* * *
'"To hold a will contingent or conditional, it
must reasonably ap·pear that the testator intended
the will not to take effect unless a stated condition
was fulfilled."
In Bagnall v. Bagnall, (Texas) 2·25 S.W. 2d 401,
the court clearly set forth the considerations controlling
a determination of whether or not the will is conditional.
That court stated at page 402:
"In determining whether a will is contingent
or otherwise, the thing to be determined is whether
the happening of the possibility referred to is a
condition precedent to the operation of the will,
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or whether the possibility of the happening "·as
only a statement of the 1notive or inducement
which led to the preparation and execution of the
instrument. If the condition n1entioned is a condition precedent to the validity of the "·ill, ~uch
contingency must have taken place in order to
entitle the will to probate; if the possibility nlentioned is only the inducement \Yhich prompted the
making of the will then such will is effective upon
the testator's death even though such event doe~
not take place."
Illustrations of contingent wills are giYen at 57 Am.
Jur. 455 1 Wills, Sec. 673:

"* * * Perhaps the clearest illustration of a
conditional or contingent will is where the testator
refers in the will to his possible death upon a trip
contemplated by him, especially a prospective Yoyage overseas, from the dangers consequent upon
military service, from a sickness with \vhich the
testator was afflicted when he executed the 'rill,
or from a surgical operation to which it \vas then
in prospect he would he required to submit, as a
condition of the effectiveness of the will. The will
becomes unconditional upon the occurrence of the
testator's death in the Jnanner or under the ('ircumstances stated in the condition."
The situation presented by the case at bar is one
which clearly demonstrates that the will in question is a
conditional one. Mr. Ellerbeck was very sick and "·as
taken to the hospital two days before the will was utade.
The Record shows that he was very concerned about
his business and some of the things that should be done
in connection with it (R. 38, 39). ThP will itself is on a
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state1nent. lTndoubtedly the 'vill \vas hurriedly written.
Other,vise In ore for1nali ties 'vould have been taken and
certainly at least a blank piece of paper \vould have been
obtained. ,,~ e sub1nit that this is some indication that the

"Till "Tas regarded merely as a thing to take care of the
situation if ~Ir. Ellerbeck died while in the hospital and
from the illness he then had. The language of the will
clearly discloses an intent that it was not to take effect
in the event he did survive or, to put it as it is in the
will, it \vas only to take effect "in the event that I do not
survive". It is hard to believe that there could be stronger
language used by the deceased to express the thought
and intention that he was only taking care of the situation if he should die while there at the hospital.
The subject of contingent wills has been annotated
at 11 A.L.R. 846, supplemented at 79 .A.L.R. 1168. One
of the things that becomes apparent upon reading the
cases and these annotations is that wherever the purported testator has been ill when he makes the will and
has· placed therein words referring to such illness and
that the bequests are made in the event he does not survive, the courts have held the wills conditional.
Where such matters as journeys, voyages or military
service are involved the courts have sometimes held the
wills conditional -

sometimes not conditional. One of

the n1ost recent cases on this rna tter is the case of Bagnall
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v. Bagnall, (Texas) 225 S.W. 2d 401, reversing 222 S.,r.
2d 1015. In that case the testator \vas anticipating a
hunting and fishing trip. Before he left he n1ade the
following will:
"Remember me W. W. Bagnall by this. If
anything happens to me. While gone. All 1ny belongings and estate goes to James B. Bagnall
Brother of mine."
He returned from the trip. He died some little tiJne
later while performing the usual duties of his occupation.
The court held that this was a contingent will and denied
it probate. In reaching this result the court stated:
"In this case the writer of the instrument begins the conditional clause with the conjunction
'if', which clearly expresses a condition; it means
'provided' or 'in case that'. Then, as if to emphasize what he has in mind, the testator adds a~ a
separate sentence the words 'while gone'. In this
connection it is to be noted that the word gone has
a well defined meaning. It means 'departed',
'absent', 'to depart or pass from one station in
space to another which is implied as farther
away'."
Analyzing the language of the will in the case at bar,
a similar result must be reached. No stronger words
could be used showing a condition than the words here
used, "in the event that I do not survive".

Wilson v·. Higgason, 207 Ark. 32, 178 S.W. 2d R55,
is a case involving a situation where the individual was
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ill and in the hospital. The purported testator wrote a
letter to one Lillie Higgason. He referred to the fact
that he \vas in the hospital sick and that there were a
number of things that he should do. He then stated:
ht:

*

* Now Lillie since I have made you 1ny

beneficiary in all my insurance I want you, in
event that I should die any time soon, to collect
all my insurance and if I have any money left anywhere I would want you to get it and divide it
equally * * *.

*

*

*

"* * * I'm just doing this so in case I should
die any time soon you would know how I would
want my little mite disposed. of * * *".
This will was made March 10, 1929 and the testator
1

died September 8, 1941, some twelve and one-half years
later. It was held that this will showed an intent that
distribution should be made in accord with it only in
case of the death of the testator "any time soon".
Another case involving sickness is that of Dougherty

v. Holscheider, 40 ·Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S.W. 11'13. The
will there involved provided as follows:
"Friend Jim I am going to start to Monterey
tomorrow to have a surgical operation performed
on me, and possibly I may never get back alive.
The doctors have said that it would not be dangerous, but in case anything should happen I want
you to see what I have left."
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A second letter involved stated as follo,vs:
"I wrote you some weeks ago and told you
that I intended undergoing an operation, and that
before doing so that I would write you and tell you
what to do with my stuff in case anything happened to me."
This was held to be contingent, and the court stated:
"We think the words of the letter indicate
clearly that it was written merely as an expedient
in case of death resulting from the operation. In
both letters he desires certain things done 'in case
anything happened' evidently in connection 'vith
the operation."
One of the best discussions of this subject is found in
the case of Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S.W. 800,
11 A.L.R. 832. The following will was considered:
"June 8, 1917
HDear Aunt Mintie:- On Sunday evening I
go to St. Elizabeth's Hospital to have a slight operation. I do not anticipate any trouble, but one
never knows. If anything should happen to Ine, I
want you please to do this for me. See that everything I have in the world goes to George B. Goinersall. He is dearer to 1ne than anything in this
world, and he deserves it. You n1ay think thi~ i~
too much, but I don't believe you will, and it is
1ny wish. If there is anything around the house
you want, of course it is yours. The sideboard belongs to Sam Long. You have been far better to
me than I deserve, and I love you better than you
will ever know.
With very n1uch love,
~fame S. Long."
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She recovered fron1 the operation and did not die until
December, 1917.
The "\Yill \Yas dated June 8. She went to the hospital June lOth, left the hospital June 21st and finally delivered the purported will to the beneficiary Gomersall
on June 2-::l:th, a date after she had recovered from the conternplated operation. After reviewing many authorities
the court concluded that the will in question was contingent and, therefore, the lower courts were correct in refusing to admit it to probate. In so far as material here,
the court concluded the law to be as follows :
"It may also, as we think, be fairly gathered
from all the authorities that, if the will is so
phrased as to clearly show that it was intended to
take effect only upon the happening of the particular event set forth in the paper as the reason
for writing it, or, putting it in other words, if it
was written only to make provision against a
death that might occur on account of or as a result of the specific thing assigned as a reason for
writing the will, it will be a contingent will; but if
the causes assigned for writing it are merely a
general statement of the reasons or a narrative
of conditions that induced the testator to make
his will, it will not be a contingent will, although it
may set forth probable or anticipated dangers
or conditions that induced the testator to write
1't • "

In the case at bar the conditional character of the
language of the will is more certain than in the Walker
case. In the case at bar the deceased referred to the fact
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that he \vas in the Holy Cross Hospital and, again, he
used that very strong language "in the event that I do
not survive". Considering the language in the Walker
case in relation to the will being considered by us it at
once becomes apparent that under the Walker case this is
a contingent will. The court there said :

"* * * She did not intend, when this paper
vv-as written, that it should be a pern1anent disposition of her property, or that it should be her
last will, no matter when or where she died, or
fro1n what cause, but only that it should be her
last will in the event she died in St. Elizabeth's
Hospital as a result of the operation. F·ear of
the fatal result that might follow the operation
was the moving cause, and the only cause, that
influenced her to write it, and it was only this
probable calamity that she wanted to provide
her. It was a temporary disposition, intended to
meet a present emergency, and when the einergency it was intended to provide against passed,
the paper ceased to have any force or effect. Thi~
letter is not susceptible of any other construetion."
The court then used the strongest language that it
could think of for a contingent will and it reads like the
will in the case at bar. The court stated:
"If she had said in the letter, 'I only intend
this disposition of 1ny estate to be effective in thP.
event I do not survive the operation I an1 about to
sub1nit to,' it would not manifP~t her purpo~P in
writing it n1ore clearly than the words she enlployed."
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The proponent here testified that she kept the 'vill
until after "Jfr. Ellerbeck returned home and that when
she returned it to him he told her that he would show
her w·here he \Yould put it, 'vhich he did (R.36). This
TValJ.t'er case completely answers any contention that
could be n1ade on behalf of the proponent because of this
conduct. _A. s noted above the testator delivered the will
to the beneficiary after recovery a.nd this was held not to
be a republication and that the intent at the time of making the 'vill 'vould be con trolling with particular significance being given to the language of the will itself.
In Davis v. D·avis, 107 Miss. 2·45·, 65 So. 2·41, the testator while lying in a hospital awaiting an operation wrote
a letter to his mother which stated in part:
"Should I not get over this operation I want
you and Papa to take charge of everything I've
got."
The court held that this will was contingent.
In Ellison v. Smoot's Adm., 2'86 Ky. 768, 151 s·.w.
2d 1017, the testatrix wrote a letter to her sister in which
she expressed despondency and stated that she didn't
feel very strong. She then wrote:
"If I can't live through it and anything happens to me I want you to have what I have."
The testatrix did not die until two years and four
1nonths later. It wa.s held that the will was conditional
and should not be admitted to probate.
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The two annotations above cited are subdiYided "~ith
reference to the occasion of peril "'"hich it "Tas contended
would make the will contingent. It is to be noted that
there are five cases cited having relation to "death from
sickness or operation" and in each instance the occasion
being referred to with particularity was held to constitute a conditional 'viii. Re Cook, 173 Cal. 465, 160 Pac.
553, Davis v. Davis, 107 Miss. 245, 65 S.o. 241, Dougherty
v. H olscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S.W. 1113,
Underwood v. Rutan, 101 Ohio St. 306, 128 N.E. 7~, Ellison v. Smoot's Adm., 286 Ky. 768, 151 S.W. 2d 1017.
Many other cases could be cited where the contingency
relied upon was a return from a trip, voyage or military
service, but we submit that the foregoing cases relating
to recovery from a particular illness are the cases in
point. The other cases are contained in the annotation:-\
heretofore referred to.
Contingency of a will depends largely upon 'vhether
the peril in question is referred to as the occasion or inducement for making the will or whether it is 1nade a
condition on the happening of which the will is to be operative.
The will at bar refers to the hospitalization and sickness as both. In other words, it was not only the

oe<·a-

sion or inducement, but also failure to survive therefronl 'vas the condition necessary to make the will op-
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erative. This is pointed up in the case of Dougherty v.
Dougherty, 4 l\let. (Ky.) 25. The will there involved read
in part as follows:

HI, James Dougherty, of the county of Franklin and state of Kentucky, hath this day made this
my last will and testament, as I intend starting
in a few days to the state of Missouri, and should
anything happen that I should not return alive,
n1y wish is that all of my land and negroes, and
all I leave behind me, after paying my just debts,
be kept in the hands of the bishop of the diocese of
Scott county, as trustee * * *".
The testator made the contemplated trip to Missouri
and returned home and died later. The court held the
will to be contingent and, in doing so, stated:
"The words in relation to the trip to Missouri
contain two ideas: the one a reason for making
· a will, and the other the condition upon which the
paper is to take effect as a will. The exp-ression,
'as I intend starting in a few days to the state
of Missouri,' refers to the contemplated trip as the
reason for making the will; and the remainder
of the language, 'and should anything happen
that I should not return alive, my wish is,' etc.,
makes, in unequivocal terms, a contingency or
condition upon which the paper was to operate as
his will."
Let us turn to a closer analysis of the will in the
light of the foregoing authorities. The first words establish the inducement or motive for the making of the will.
"Being in the Holy Ctoss Hospital from digestive and
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other troubles". It refers with particularity to the place
and troubles he was experiencing. Next co1nes language
which has nothing to do with motive or induce1nent. These
next words refer to the particular event of his hospitalization and the causes thereof. These are the "·ords of
condition. They clearly show upon what condition this

"* * * in the event I do not

will is to become effective,

survive". This could only refer to a failure to survire
from his then hospitalization and sickness. It could not
refer to the general proposition of survival. In such
sense none of us will survive. But he particularized the
survival of which he was writing and that \vas his hospitalization in the Holy Cross Hospital and his sickness
there.
After the foregoing he states that the proponent is to
take charge of his home and such little business as might
exist there. He then writes: "Further, she is to havP

IllY

co1nplete portion of the estate left by my father * * *".
We submit that the first words of the will establish the
inducement for making it and the condition upon which
it is to be effective. Any doubt of this is dispelled by th(\
use of the word "further". The only sense that ean bP
given to this word ties the balance of the language in
with the preceding language. Further, <H·eor(ling to \Yebster means as here used "in addition'' HnlorPovPr"

'

'

'

'

,

"furthermore''. Its use establish('s the intention of the
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deceased to make ·this dependent upon the condition of
his survival and to make the entire will stand or fall upon
such condition.
As a P.S. he writes "I appoint Mrs. Ruth Clayton
Haws to serve as executrix without bond." All this does
is place in legal language that which is already set forth
in the first of the will. She is to be in charge of his estate-but in \vhat event. That has been made conditional
upon his survival fron1 the particular hospitalization and
sickness referred to.
We submit that the will must be considered as a
whole. It was made to take care of a particular emergency which had arisen in the life of Ben B. Ellerbeck
whereby he sought as clearly as he could to make disposition of his property in the event he did not survive
that emergency.
We submit that this will is contingent and that it
was meant only for the purpose of making a temporary
disposition of property to meet a particular condition
which existed, to wit, his fear that he might not survive his then hospitalization.
The evidence establishes that he survived and recovered from this hospitalization and since the condition upon which the effectiveness of this will depended
did not occur it did not become the will of Ben B. Ellerbeck and it should not have been admitted to probate.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that this Court should reverse the order of the trial court, directing the lo,ver
court to refuse to admit said will to probate.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
Attorneys for Contestant and
Appellant
530 Judge Building
·salt Lake City, Utah
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